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SECURITY INFORMATION

DRAFT

FOREIGN MATERIEL FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

APPENDIX - SECTION-I

GENERAL

3 January 1952

The exploitation of foreign materiel can provide accurate and timely information necessary to determine the technical, economic and scientific capabilities affecting the war potential of enemies and potential enemies. Such exploitation is essential in developing effective countermeasures to enemy weapons and in determining United State requirements in the research and development fields. It is also useful in establishing a basis for judgment and estimates concerning:

- a. Strategic plans, capabilities and possible courses of action.
- b. Tactical plans and tactical use of weapons.
- c. State of technological development.
- d. Scientific capabilities for waging war.
- e. Economic strength for waging war.
- f. Strategic and tactical targets, industrial complexes, etc.
- g. Developing plans for attack and for active and passive defense.

Recognizing the value of intelligence which may be secured through exploitation of foreign materiel the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) has approved this directive for the operation of the Joint Materiel Intelligence Agency (JMIA).

TECHNICAL EXPLOITATION UNITS: All echelons in the military structure are concerned with the exploitation of foreign materiel for intelligence purposes.

Field teams exploit captured materiel to secure information of immediate

DIA, JCS and OSD review(s) completed.

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operational significance; theatre joint intelligence divisions coordinate theatre activities in the exploitation of foreign materiel; JMA functions at the departmental level and provides a coordinating point for inter-departmental materiel acquisitions, requirements, exploitation, and reporting procedures thereon so as to facilitate an effective and aggressive materiel analysis program and avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and expense in the exploitation process.

P.2 (2) DEFINITIONS: "Foreign Materiel" as used in this directive, consists of any military articles used by troops in a military campaign, the analysis of which may be expected to reveal information which will assist in gauging enemy of potential enemy war potential. Cryptological materiel is excluded from this definition unless and until released by the Armed Forces Security Agency. (AFSA)

"Captured Materiel" as used herein consists of those items of "Foreign Materiel" acquired or expected to be acquired through normal combat operations. Also included are those items of United States materiel coming into possession of an enemy or potential enemy and subsequently being returned to the United States jurisdiction through recapture or otherwise.

P.3 (1) DOCUMENTS: Documents such as ——— blue prints, operating instructions, log books, etc., which pertain to the manufacture, construction, operation, performance and maintenance of foreign materiel require special handling if

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a. When acquired with the material to which they relate.

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b. If the materiel itself is useful for intelligence purposes.

Such documents will be tagged and attached to the item of material to which they pertain. At the earliest opportunity such documents will be reproduced, appropriate notations made respecting the item upon which the original is

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attached including disposition of the item. (Delete "if known." This is a loophole, and is difficult to define for purposes of follow-up. If disposition is stated merely as "unplanned" or "unknown" this is better than delaying reporting because disposition plans are unknown, or the condition of disposition is not stated at all.) The original documents will accompany the item of materiel and the reproductions will be forwarded to the nearest Document Intelligence Center or other document agency for handling in accordance with SR 380-350-2, OPNAV Instr. 03863, AFOIN-C/DD 350.09 "Captured Enemy Documents".

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If the documents do not meet any of the above criteria they shall be forwarded directly to the nearest document agency for handling in accordance with the aforementioned "Captured Enemy Documents." (It is important to keep the documents with the materiel for numbers analysis in any of the stipulated conditions, not only all the stipulated conditions exist.)

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SECTION-II

MISSION, FUNCTIONS AND OPERATING RELATIONSHIPS

AUTHORITY: The Joint Materiel Intelligence Agency (JMIA) is established and approved by the Secretary of Defense as a permanent subordinate agency of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).

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MISSION: To conduct for intelligence purposes a program for the coordination, within the military establishment, and in conjunction with other government agencies, of acquisition, requirements, and exploitation of foreign military materiel, and to establish a reporting system thereon to insure proper dissemination of all such information within the intelligence community. (Delete "to insure an efficient continuing intelligence effort," as gratuitous.)

REQUIREMENTS FOR FOREIGN MATERIEL:

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a. Full responsibility for formulation of its own requirements for foreign materiel rests with each Service and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (Delete "and also for effective collection action." The function of collection effort must be viewed independently of requirements in order to give it its proper emphasis.)

b. Each agency shall keep JMIA cognizant of its requirements for foreign materiel.

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c. JMIA shall act as a clearing house for all information on each phase of the program of all the participating agencies, and establish, on a continuing basis, the necessary central records in order to make available to participating agencies operational information concerning

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the progress of the materiel items. JMIC will be responsible for reviewing such information and taking such coordinating action as may be necessary to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and expense.

d. An agency having a requirement for foreign materiel expected to be acquired as a result of normal combat operations may place same directly upon its own collection units with concurrent advice to JMIC.

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e. Requirements for foreign materiel to be acquired through special missions or operations, shall be coordinated by the requiring agency with the other Armed Services and CIA. (Delete "in all cases where security limitations permit." The posting of requirements does not impinge upon security caution beyond the norm, and is irrelevant. The collection function may do so.)

f. Requirements for all foreign materiel for intelligence purposes other than that described in d and e above shall be submitted by each agency to JMIC. Within a period designated by the requiring agency, consistent with the urgency of the collection action and the provision of a reasonable opportunity for JMIA coordination, JMIA will advise the requiring agency whether additional requirements exist and whether a collection effort has already been initiated or effected. The requiring agency need not delay collection action after expiration of the designated period or receipt of information from JMIA whichever is earlier.

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g. (Delete entire paragraph. Acquisition and reporting on acquisitions should be handled under separate heading - not under requirements.)

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h. JMIA shall coordinate for the military services in conjunction with other agencies, theatre of operations' requirements for foreign materiel to be acquired outside their areas of responsibility in accordance with the foregoing principles.

i. JMIA shall perform such other functions in the coordination of requirements, as may be directed by the JIC.

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ACQUISITION AND DISPOSAL: JMIA shall:

a. Through appropriate channels initiate the necessary inquiries or surveys of foreign materiel available by major category or itemized item inventory, whichever is more practical, and disseminate the results of such survey with a view to insure that every advantageous opportunity for acquisition of such materiel for intelligence use by the appropriate collection agency may be taken.

It is recognized that actual exploitation may take place at any stage of the movement of the item, whether in the field, theater of operation or in the zone of interior, by any of the participating agencies depending on the time or program for movement of such items and the resources of the requiring agency. JMIA shall coordinate and facilitate such participating exploitation.

However, in fulfilling such coordination responsibilities, JMIA shall be primarily concerned that such exploitation will not damage the item so as to make it impossible for other agencies to apply their requirements, until final disposal action has been planned.

JMIA shall insure that damaging exploitation will be reserved until final disposal action is contemplated, and further insure that no final disposal action shall be taken until all participating agencies

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concur. If a reasonable time after notification to participating agencies (1 month approximately) has passed without a response by a participating agency, such should be deemed as a concurrence by that agency as to the suggested final disposal action.

b. The actual acquisition for intelligence purposes of items of foreign materiel shall be reported to JMIA by the acquiring agency promptly. JMIA will promptly disseminate such information to other participating agencies.

MOVEMENT AND EXPLOITATION: JMIA shall:

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a. Determine the appropriate military component in the ZI to conduct the exploitation of foreign materiel in any case where military participating agencies are in disagreement. In any other participating agency case, JMIA shall coordinate action with the appropriate agency.

b. Through appropriate channels to theatre commanders direct and control the movement of captured materiel to the appropriate intelligence exploitation agency in the ZI.

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c. Insure that all interested agencies are immediately informed of the arrival and location of foreign materiel to be exploited for intelligence purposes: if a program or schedule of exploitation contemplated has been formulated, this should be included, however, the immediate notification to all interested agencies must not be delayed for purposes of compiling exploitation requirements to accompany this notification. (Delete "in the ZI" etc. - - -)

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d. Insure that exploitation requirements of other participating agencies are incorporated in the exploitation program of the holding

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agency, or met in another manner. (Delete "whenever and to the degree practicable" which are large unnecessary loopholes, or if not, are meaningless.)

c. Establish a central system of control numbers for continuing identification of foreign materiel acquired for intelligence purposes.

OTHER OPERATIONS: When foreign materiel, other than as previously defined, is acquired under opportunistic conditions in the course of other military operations or duties, the items will be reported as heretofore provided. Requirements for and movement of such items will also follow the procedures as outlined. ☒ Exploitation and disposal will be referred initially by JMIA to the appropriate non-military agencies, on the understanding that items falling within the original definition of this paper, and acquired by the non-military agencies will be initially referred to JMIA for exploitation and disposal.7

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DISSEMINATION: JMIA shall:

Insure that the agency examining and analyzing the materiel will fully exercise its responsibility for the full and adequate dissemination of foreign materiel intelligence information. The insurance of the appropriate, timely dissemination of such information by exploiting agencies is a responsibility of JMIA.

LIAISON: JMIA shall:

a. Maintain liaison with the various ZI intelligence agencies of the Armed Services and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as necessary for the accomplishment of its mission.

b. Maintain liaison with joint intelligence divisions or similar organizations, in theatres of operations as may be appropriate for

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accomplishment of its mission at the departmental level, and to meet theatre materiel intelligence requirements of an inter-departmental nature.

c. Under prevailing policy, maintain liaison with agencies of friendly nations which also have cognizance of exploitation of materiel for intelligence purposes, in order to effect necessary or desirable coordination and augment the availability to the United States of information secured from such exploitation.

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SECTION-III

ORGANIZATION

ORGANIZATION: JMIA shall consist of:

a. A Director and Deputy Director designated as such by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and an Advisor to the Director who will represent the interests of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of State, and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and who shall be nominated by the CIA. The Departments of the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy shall rotate in that order in nominating officers for designation as Director and Deputy Director. The tour of duty and the grade of the officers serving in these positions are as prescribed by the JIC.

b. Additional military and civilian personnel necessary to implement its assigned functions as approved by the JIC.

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